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Institutions and economic science: links between cognitive processes and the 
emergence of social rules 
Angela Ambrosino 
 
Abstract 
Standard economic theory has long underestimated the role of institutions in 
economic systems and in the processes of change, focusing on equilibrium and the 
mechanisms that determine it spontaneously. Equilibrium, once achieved, is only 
interfered by external shocks (exogenous shocks) and it is not disturbed by dynamics 
developing within the system. Institutions, in this theoretical framework, are 
functional to achieve efficient outcomes but play no role in the process of economic 
change (North, 1990). 
On the other hand, the heterodox approach to the economics, targeting the research 
into the processes by which institutions emerge and change, highlights their 
importance in social dynamics. Economics of institutions changes the focus of the 
analysis: it does not start from the study of the effects that given institutions can have 
on the economic systems, but it focuses on individual behavior and on the cognitive 
processes that determine it. This research field investigates the dynamics through 
which the interaction between agents determines the emergence of social institutions 
and how the latter are able to evolve and to graft changing processes in individuals. 
This article aims to introduce the reader to this research area in which the links 
between mind and institutions become an essential element in the analysis of 
economic role institutions. 
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1.Introduction	
Standard economic theory (1) has long underestimated the role of institutions in 
economic systems and in the processes of economic change, focusing the analysis on 
the mechanisms that lead to states equilibrium that can be altered only through 
external shocks (exogenous shocks) (2).  
According to standard economic theory, as noted, exchanges take place without costs 
and the institutional dimension has a negligible value (3). Starting from the 
assumption of substantive rationality, neoclassical economics holds that even if 
agents may initially form erroneous models for achieving their objectives, processes 
of information feedback will correct the initial error and punish deviant behavior, 
prompting the agents to schemes of appropriate conduct. The return to equilibrium 
will occur spontaneously. 
In this theoretical context, institutions have the only task of providing essential 
information to follow correct behaviors. They are functional to achieve efficient 
outcomes but do not play an independent role in the evolution of the economic 
system (North, 1990). 
  
On the other hand, the heterodox approach to the economics, targeting his research 
into the processes by which institutions emerge and change highlights their 
importance in social dynamics. 
Heterodox economics (4) follows a different approach. Vernon Smith (1989), Nobel 
laureate in economics in 2002, said that one of the first and most important lessons 
learned in the sixties through the application of the experiments to the analysis of 
markets has been the discovery of the relevance of institutions in economic 
interactions. 
This is not a new idea. As we shall see, it was already present in the history of 
economic thought but has only recently been re-evaluated, and thus developed by 
economists. 
Already the Old Institutional Economics -important school of economic thought born 
in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century- had stressed 
the need to introduce institutions into economic science and the analysis of the 
contributions derived from other research fields like psychology, as able to help 
economists understand individual behavior. In this context, the sociologist and 
economist Thorstein Veblen -author considered one of the founding fathers of this 
school of thought- had identified a close interrelationship between the instincts, 
habits and institutions, which showed the presence of reciprocal causation processes 
between the evolution of individual behavior and the evolution of social institutions 
(Hodgson 1998). 
The presence of these two-way causation processes between individual behavior and 
institutions makes necessary to study individuals and institutions in a unitary 
framework, which, starting from the individual and his individual cognitive 
mechanisms, makes possible a better understanding of human action, the role the 
institutions and the interaction between individual action and the environment. 
This type of investigation places in the foreground the psychological mechanisms 
involved in the relationship between agents and institutions. This kind of research 
will necessarily place side by side the typical theoretical tools of economics and the 
results obtained in other research fields such as psychology, sociology, and 
neurobiology. 
This article aims to introduce the reader to this research field. To this end, we first try 
to define what economics –with a preeminent attention to cognitive economics- 
means when it uses the term institution highlighting the complex nature of the 
concept to which it refers. Second, the article will highlight the role of institutions in 
the process of economic change, focusing on the link between individual cognitive 
mechanisms and institutional evolution. 
 
2. Economics of institutions: why a cognitive approach?	
The basic assumptions of standard economic models (perfect information, no 
transaction costs, presence of perfectly rational economic agents) allow the 
construction of equilibrium models in which change can only be induced by factors 
exogenous to the system, and it is excluded the need to investigate topics such as: 
a. the definition of economic institutions 
  
b. the role and complexity of institutions 
c. the institutional change process. 
The need to define the institutions emerges significantly in research areas -such as the 
economy of the institutions, the economy transaction costs, the cognitive economics, 
law and economics, behavioral economics, the economy of developing countries, and 
others- that deviate from the neoclassical economic theory and that in recent decades 
have contributed to developing heterodox approaches. This article will focus on the 
reconstruction, through the contribution of the history of economic thought, of the 
path that led to the birth and the consolidation of that part of the economics of the 
institutions which incorporates the fundamentals of the Old institutionalist school and 
of cognitive theory of institutions. These areas of study, in fact, have common roots 
and both develop the research into institutions from the analysis of individual 
behavior. 
The concept of institution in economics includes both informal and formal 
institutions. Informal institutions refer to the set of social norms, conventions, moral 
values, religious beliefs, traditions or more in general to any rule of behavior shared 
by a social group, this kind of institutions emerges from repeated interactions and  
they are able to guide agents’ behavior. 
On the other hand, formal institutions belong to the sphere of codified law: 
constitutions, laws, regulations. Also economic organizations belong to the set of 
formal institutions, because, on one hand, they can exist under an explicit set of rules, 
on the other hand, they survive and evolve thanks to informal norms that develop 
within them determining the efficiency of an organization. 
Economic literature has provided different definitions of institutions. They have been 
described as constraints that govern the political, economic and social interactions 
(North, 1991), as rules of behavior that emerge from the interaction of perfectly 
rational actors in repeated interactions (5) Schotter, 1981, 1986), or as structures 
governance (Williamson, 2000). In these definitions institutions and individuals are 
mostly "objects" to be investigated separately. 
By the contrary, cognitive economics of institutions emphasizes the need to study 
economic agents and institutions in a unified framework (Rizzello and Turvani, 2000, 
2002; Ambrosino, 2006, 2012, 2014, 2015). As mentioned, this approach bases its 
foundations on the contributions resulting from schools of thought of the past, that 
share a theory of human nature that replaces the traditional economic agent with a 
multidimensional man, whose behavior is determined by psychological and socio-
cultural elements  (Jensen, 1987). 
Cognitive economics recognizes the importance of this multidimensionality and 
develops his research from the relationship between individual behavior and 
institutions, identifying in the mind and in individuals’ cognitive processes the central 
element of his investigation.  
Institutions in their constant interaction with economic agents lose their purely 
functional nature and become the expression of cognitive abilities that are not innate 
in the individuals but develop through repeated interaction between subjects (Rizzello 
and Turvani, 2000, 2002 Ambrosino, 2006, 2012). Institutions do not configure only 
  
as constraints of economic agents’ behavior, but  they also constitute the framework 
within which it becomes possible to make choices that otherwise would not be 
accessible (North, 1990). They shape and change the aspirations of individuals 
(Hodgson, 2004a, 2004b). 
Individuals, in turn, play an active role in the processes of institutional change by 
changing their behavior all the time that the context in which they act changes 
(Ambrosino, 2012). Individuals and institutions influence each other. 
Social norms (institutions) emerge as a result of human action and the ongoing 
feedback between individual choices and the external environment. Institutions may 
change over time through a cultural selection process that allows the survival of the 
rule that is more effective for maintaining social order (Hayek, 1988). 
As argued by Denzau and North (1994) there is a close link between mental models 
(6), institutions and cultural context: 
 
"The cultural heritage Provides a means of reducing the divergence in the mental 
models That people in a society have And Also constitutes a means for the 
intergenerational transfer of unifying perceptions ..... The relationship between 
mental models and institutions is an intimate one. Mental models are the internal 
representations That individual cognitive systems create to interpret the environment; 
institutions are the external ... mechanisms individuals create to structure and order 
the environment .... "(p.363). 
 
Understanding mental models become an indispensable step for economic theory of 
institutions. For this purpose, the cognitive economics is based on an interdisciplinary 
methodological approach which has highlighted the complexity of individual 
decision-making and the close relationship between perception and conscious 
reasoning (Innocenti 2009, Kahneman and Frederick, 2002). 
 
3. Cognitive processes and institutions in cognitive economics 
The history of economic thought provides important insights into the link between 
mind and institutions. 
Veblen- author recognized among the founding fathers of the old institutionalist 
school- in 1919  defined institutions as "settled habit of thought common to the 
generality of men" (Veblen, 1919, p. 239), making it clear that the concept of habit 
plays a crucial role both in defining the institutions, and in the definition of individual 
action. 
This author is strongly influenced by the debate around the definition of the concept 
of habit that characterizes the psychology of the early twentieth century (while not 
entering explicitly in it). Veblen is in contact with authors such as William 
McDougall, C. Lloyd Morgan, and William James, who are precursors of behaviorist 
psychology (Reisman, 1969 Tilman, 1996). From these authors’ work, he borrows 
the concepts of instinct and habit but using them in an original and more complex 
way than the Behaviorists propose (Tilman, 1996). In fact, he focuses his analysis on 
the social consequences of human action but he gives great importance to the 
  
decision-making processes that develop in human mind. An essential element of his 
analysis is the double bond between institutions, habits, and individual behavior 
(Veblen, 1899, Hodgson, 1998). Habits are fundamental both in shaping as in the 
stability of institutions (Hodgson, 1993a). They also are part of the cognitive abilities 
of individuals. The skills learned are gradually enclosed in habits. When these 
become part of the common culture of a social group they are transformed into 
routines and habits (Commons, 1934). At this point, institutions are formed as a 
complex and durable routine and encoded habits, and they can survive and be 
transmitted in time. 
Institutions thus allow individuals to share common cognitive tools, through which 
they can easily conform to the behavior of other members of the group. The imitation 
of common behaviors at the same time allows the spread of the same habits of 
behavior and of thought and leads to the emergence and consolidation of institutions 
(Hodgson, 1998). Habits of behavior and institutional structures are therefore 
connected to each other and are mutually reinforcing (Hodgson, 1988, 2003a, 2004a). 
Institutions emerge from agents’ interaction, whose preferences and objectives are 
determined by the economic and social conditions in which they are to act. The 
individual is considered something more than just an economic agent subjected to the 
"domain" of institutions that characterize the social context in which he lives. Agents 
are, of course, conditioned by institutions and the cultural context, but, in turn, create, 
intentionally or unintentionally, institutions themselves and influence on them. 
Old institutional economics do not consider the economic system to be built up by 
homogeneous economic agents. The "institutionalizing" function of institutions is to 
allow social order and relative stability in a system made up of heterogeneous 
individuals (Hodgson, 1998). 
Although institutionalists recognize the active role that individuals play in economic 
processes and highlight the need to take into account the complexity of psychological 
elements, and sociological and cultural factors that determine agents’ behavior, they 
still remain focused more on the social level of the analysis than on the individual 
one. 
On the contrary, Friedrich August von Hayek -Nobel Prize for Economics in 1974- 
focuses on the individual and argues that there is a close interrelationship between 
agents’ cognitive processes and the cultural dynamics  of selection of institutions that 
generate social order. The starting point of this reasoning is Hayek’s model of mind 
described in the The Sensory Order (1952). This text contributes to the development 
of theoretical psychology of the time, was published only many years after its 
completion. Mainstream economics always denies the relevance of these studies on 
how mind works for the development of Hayek's economic theory. However 
cognitive economics highlights the close interconnection between Hayek's theory of 
mind and his research in the economics. According to Hayek, human mind is a 
framework that orders perceptions through interpretative acts; it operates through 
classification processes, allows identifying a particular sensory data as different from 
another, by association processes of classes of stimuli to classes of responses. Human 
mind is an active tool that continuously interacts with the environment creating new 
  
images of itself and the world. These images represent the framework within which 
individuals can give meaning to information that comes from outside, and 
consequently choose their action. 
Human mind evolves through a slow learning process by which innate genetic 
structures and personal experience interact giving rise to new representations of 
themselves and of the world around them. What emerges from Hayek's theory of 
mind, and his political and social studies confirms the importance of reciprocal 
causation relationship between individual behavior and social institutions, and makes 
an important contribution to the understanding of the mental processes involved in 
this interaction.  
Hayek, in fact, stresses the central role of the interpretative processes of external data 
in determining the individuals’ behavior. Action emerging  as the result of 
interpretive processes gets feedback from the environmenti. When this feedback is 
positive this action is strengthened, becoming the rule of conduct to be implemented 
whenever agent has to take a decision in situations similar to the previous one. 
Sharing rules of conduct within the social group leads to the emergence of social 
norms (formal or informal) that govern the interaction between economic agents. 
However, these rules are not immutable, in fact, every time the environment gives 
negative feedback or every time it changes (changing the data available for 
individuals), agents will start new interpretive processes to elaborate new strategies 
of behavior. Such strategies, on the one hand, will again be the starting point for the 
emergence of new shared norms of behavior; on the other, they represent the 
beginning of the process that pushes the change of formal institutions of a given 
economic system (Ambrosino, 2014). 
  
4. A program for the future 
The cognitive approach to economic institutions bases his investigation on a 
representation of human nature that is derived from Hayek's theory mind, improved by 
Veblen’s instinct-habit theory ( Ambrosino, 2012b, Rizzello, 2003). 
Like Original Institutional Economics, cognitive economics develops the idea that 
human behavior is driven by habits, routines, and conventions, and influenced by 
culture. These are the elements from which institutions emerge. 
In this perspective, understanding institutions means to understand how they develop 
by habits, what role the shared culture has in their emergence and evolution, how they 
evolve over time. 
Cognitive economics describes institutions as tools that helps individuals (who are 
multidimensional and basically immersed a socio-cultural context that shapes the 
behavior) to function effectively in society (Ambrosino, 2006, 2012, 2015). Institutions 
bring social order, standardize behaviors, and model agents’ aspirations.  
Because of the close relationship between mind and institutions, the study of the latter 
can not shrink the analysis of laws and formal rules. There are many types of 
institutions that emerge and evolve along channels different from simple legislative 
process. Some institutions appear and develop without, or with little, planning on the 
part of state and legislature. The role of the state is important because no institution 
  
reaches its full development without getting recognition and legitimacy to other 
institutions. But the awareness of the necessary role of the state does not imply that this 
(or its legal instruments) may provide a more efficient solution than the spontaneous 
process of evolution of rules and customs that takes place "from below", in 
interpersonal exchange. 
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Notes 
(1) The term standard economics (or neoclassical economics) refers to the approach 
dominant in economic science that origins in the Cambridge school of Alfred 
Marshall and in the school in Lausanne through the contributions of authors such as 
Pareto and Walras. This approach is based on particular key assumptions: perfect 
rationality of economic agents (which translates into perfect ability to predict the 
outcome of their choices), perfect information and economic agents’ perfect ability to 
maximize their choices.  
 (2) According to neoclassical economics, the equilibrium state reached by the 
economic system through the free interaction of economic agents (individuals and 
companies) can only be broken by the intervention of sudden changes (shocks) that 
come from the outside. In the absence of such shocks the system remains in its 
position of stable equilibrium. 
 (3) Only starting from the work of Ronald Coase and subsequent insights by Oliver 
Williamson, economic theory recognized the presence of what are known as 
transaction costs (ie costs related to the realization of the economic transaction) of 
which it does not take into account in determining the exchange price.  
 (4) We define heterodox economic research strands all those research approaches 
that call into question the assumptions of standard economics, emphasizing the 
complexity of the individual decision-making processes. Economic actors are 
heterogeneous and they elaborate their decisions performing complex cognitive 
processes in context characterized structural uncertainty and imperfect information. 
 (5) Schotter’s definition refers to that part of economic theory that uses game theory 
to study the institutions (rules of behavior ) that emerge through repeated interaction 
between economic agents whose choices are interdependent. 
 (6) Feedback refers to the answer that the individual gets from the environment once 
he puts into practice certain behavior. Positive feedback reinforces the norm of 
behavior because it confirms the individual the goodness of his choice. On the 
contrary negative feedback causes the individual to reprocess data from outside and 
to draft a new behavioral response. 
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